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I. INTRODUCTION
When people think about the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, they
usually think in terms of equity, often envisioning public works such as road
construction. The instinctive reaction is that it would be unfair for the state
to take the property for building a road without paying for that property.
Arguments favoring compensation for regulatory takings generally employ
similar logic. If it is unfair for the government to take someone's whole house
and lot without paying, it also is unfair to take away part of a back yard or
some uses of the property without paying. A regulation prohibiting property
owners from filling in wetlands, for example, effectively deprives property
owners of the use of some of their property. If the government, representing
the public, wants to take someone's property, it should pay, even if the taking
is partial.'

* Assistant professor, George Mason University. The author also is associate director of the
Center for the Study of Market Processes; a nonprofit research center affiliated with the
university. Dr. Ellig is a former director of public policy at Citizens for a Sound Economy
Foundation and was a consultant to the President's Commission on Privatization. Dr. Ellig has
published numerous articles on government regulation of business and business management in
books, academic journals, and the popular press.
1. An influential work making this argument is RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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But why do we consider it inappropriate for government to take private
property without paying? In at least some cases, regulation delivers large
benefits to the public with only a small inconvenience to a few property
owners. This is the basis for the argument against compensation for
regulatory takings. Since these unregulated property owners would otherwise
be free to pursue their own selfish interests at the public's expense, it seems
fair that they, not the public, should be inconvenienced for the greater good.
This argument appears especially strong when applied to "externalities"-spillover effects that occur when private property owners fail to
account for the effects of their actions on other people. Open public debate
should allow elected leaders, regulators, and citizens to determine the most
pressing externality problems and curtail property rights accordingly. The
result produced by public debate is fair because all sides, including property
owners, have equal rights to participate and have their interests represented.
No one owes the property owners compensation; they have participated in an
open public debate and lost. They should accept their losses as a contribution
to the greater good, perhaps seeking solace in the fact that the government will
sometimes call upon other property owners to make similar sacrifices. 2
This second perspective has dominated most public policy debates when
private property rights are at issue. Unfortunately, it ignores the fundamental
role that property rights play in encouraging increased knowledge and
coordination of economic activity. Externalities and property rights demonstrate why compensation for every form of government takings is necessary
to enhance the quality of life associated with an advanced economy.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Regulatory takings cannot be justified in the absence of significant
"externalities."
Paradoxically, however, the best way to accomplish the
"internalization" of externalities generally is not by government regulation but
by ensuring clear property rights.
A. Externalities
The most controversial regulatory takings involve government actions
designed to mitigate externalities. 3 An externality occurs when a person fails
to consider the costs or benefits that the individual's actions create for other
people. Conceptually, the presence or absence of externalities provides a clear

2. See, e.g., Lynda Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values and Notions of
Relativity, in DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS AND THE ZONING POWER: THE CONCEPT OF VESTED
RIGHTS 9 (Richard Collins, ed. 1992).
3. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
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criterion for determining whether a proposed taking accomplishes a broad
enough public purpose to justify government involvement. Externalities that
affect a large segment of the population can reasonably be said to affect "the
public." It is much harder to explain why the public has an interest in
abrogating private property rights when spillover effects are not present,
because the use of property affects only a limited number of directly interested
parties.'
Government's role in correcting externalities arises because
significant "transaction costs" often are associated with mitigating externalities. Externalities that involve only a few interested parties likely will have
low transaction costs, so there is no role for government.'
Air
Air pollution and ugly neckties are examples of externalities.'
pollution is an externality when a polluter fails to consider the damage that
pollution imposes on other people. A coal-burning factory, for example, emits
smoke and soot into the air. These pollutants come to rest on people's homes,
laundry, and lung tissues. The true cost of producing the factory's goods
includes not only the expense of materials, labor, and machinery, but also the
cost that the pollution imposes on people in the surrounding neighborhood.
The cost of production will be inaccurately low if the factory owner fails to
calculate negative spillover costs. The factory can produce more output when
the owner fails to account for the external costs. More pollution is generated,
but the public is denied the opportunity to weigh the costs of production plus
pollution against the value of the factory's output.
Ugly neckties might sound like a trivial example of an externality, but
they help explain the concept. When selecting neckties, a person might think
primarily of the tie's impact on others; another might consider only what
appeals to that individual. The latter group might choose to wear neckties that
evoke profound displeasure among coworkers, acquaintances, and casual
passersby. Ugly ties create an externality to the extent that people wearing
ugly ties ignore the impact on others. Of course, social pressures and
informal sanctions exercise a restraint on one's choice of clothing. Theoretically, neckties are not nearly so ugly as they could be if no one cared what

4. Epstein reaches a similar conclusion. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 166-69. Epstein
focuses on the economic theory of public goods, rather than the economic theory of externalities.
The concepts of public goods and externalities are closely related. The public good theory has
two basic propositions. First, one person's consumption does not diminish the amount available
for others. Second, it is expensive to exclude nonpayers from consuming the good. National
defense and neighborhood police patrols are classic examples of public goods. Alleviating
negative externalitiesor encouraging positive externalities often satisfies the economist's definition
of a public good. For more detailed discussion of the externalities and public goods, see TYLER
COWEN, THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE (1988).

5. See infra Section III.
6. Externalities can be positive or negative; a person can impose spillover costs or confer
spillover benefits on others. This article focuses on spillover costs because the most interesting
and controversial regulatory issues involve external costs rather than external benefits.
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others thought about their clothing. Social pressure partially explains why no
one has seriously proposed regulating neckties as stringently as automobile
exhaust. 7 The necktie example illustrates that even though one person's
failure to consider spillover effects may generate an externality, government
need not automatically abridge that individual's property rights to correct the
problem.
From an economic perspective, these externalities are a problem not
because air pollution is unhealthful or ugly ties are tasteless but because they
impose burdens on people who were not given the opportunity to weigh the
costs against any accompanying benefits. As a result, industry produces too
much of the goods and services that generate pollution, and fashion designers
produce ties that are too loud or too wide. Manufacturers who consider the
desires of people breathing the air or looking at ugly ties would reduce these
forms of pollution.
Manufacturers probably would not eliminate pollution, though. Society
must allow a certain amount of pollution in order to maintain its standard of
living. For example, many people who consider themselves environmentally
conscious are willing to tolerate some carbon monoxide from automobiles
because some automobile transportation is worth the resulting carbon
monoxide emissions. Most environmentalists seek only to reduce automobile
use, not eliminate it. Even the few extremists who would like to ban
automobiles would have to rely on other forms of transportation that generate
some pollution. Returning to riding horses, for instance, would substitute one
form of pollution for another. The economic approach does not focus on
eliminating pollution but on permitting only the amount that people are willing
to bear to enjoy various goods and services.
Many environmental and land-use regulations have been justified as an
attempt to hold property owners accountable for externalities. However, it is
not clear whether the regulations induce people to evaluate external costs
accurately and make appropriate output choices. For example, the levels of
some air emissions still may be too high given the value of the goods whose
production involves emissions. Regulation also may force industry to cut
production too much; people might be willing to tolerate more emissions in
order to have more of certain products or services. The economic approach
to externalities recognizes that people make incremental tradeoffs to obtain
more of good things and less of bad things. Any policy advocacy couched in
absolutes, such as "zero emissions" or "no smoking in any public place,"
ignores the fundamental fact that people are willing to make these incremental
tradeoffs.

7. The invasiveness of government intervention and difficulty in formulating any intelligible
regulatory standard are additional important considerations in the necktie case-but these factors
also are present in regulating air pollution.
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B. Externalitiesand Public Policy
The question then becomes, "What is the most effective way to ensure
that people bear externalities only when they get enough other things in
return?" Most public policy discussions assume that the government offers the
only effective means of answering this question. Politicians and regulators get
the job of deciding how much air pollution is too much or how wide ties can
grow before they are too wide. They then craft regulations or tax schemes
that outlaw or reduce the offending behavior. As the elected representatives
of the people, politicians are assumed to have the moral legitimacy and the
knowledge of popular preferences necessary to make these decisions
intelligently.
Even some economic discussions implicitly adopt these premises with a
few minor modifications. The modifications naturally amplify the economist's
role in the policymaking process. The economist'sjob is to help policymakers
accurately assess the citizenry's true desires so that the government can
determine the "optimal" amount of pollution, poor taste in clothing, or other
externality that should be permitted. Surveys and statistical studies attempt to
place dollar values on clean air, beautiful views, and a host of other good
things. These values are then weighed against the value of things that
consumers must forego if the externalities are to be reduced, such as more
comfortable cars or warmer homes. Government officials should then control
externalities whenever the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
Once the government has determined the optimal level of externality to
permit, the economist also assists by designing the most efficient ways of
modifying citizens' behavior to achieve the policymaker's goals. Economists
usually prefer taxes, auctions, and tradable permits to "command-and-control"
regulation, because the former methods help ensure that externalities are
mitigated at the lowest possible cost. In the case of pollution, for example,
firms that can reduce their own pollution at low cost face strong incentives to
do so when monetary penalties or benefits are involved. Under command-and-control regulation, all firms face incentives to achieve only a
minimal level of compliance with the law, even if some could reduce pollution
further at a very low cost and others pay high costs just to comply. Society
could achieve an equal amount of pollution reduction at lower total cost if the
firms with high abatement costs could pay the firms with low abatement costs
to reduce their pollution by more than the law requires. By pointing out such
opportunities to regulators, the economist supposedly earns his keep.
Unfortunately, this approach to externalities, while informed by economic
theory, ignores some fundamental economic realities.' It ignores whether

8. Readers should not interpret this discussion to mean that cost-benefit analysis of regulation
is a bad idea. In the absence of cost-benefit analysis, there is nothing left to guide policymakers
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politicians and regulators will actually have the incentive to implement policies
resulting in an efficient level of externalities. It also begs the question of
whether government officials and their economic consultants can possibly have
the requisite knowledge to estimate the "optimal" level of any externality. 9
Consider each issue in turn.
1. Incentives
Until quite recently, it was fashionable for economists to offer their advice
to policymakers as if.they were addressing philosopher-kings who had every
intention of promoting the general welfare. Much popular policy discussion
still is conducted in this way. It is assumed that policymakers want to do the
"right thing," and any deviations from this norm are treated as special cases
of corruption or other moral lapses. If only we could place better people in
elected offices and appointed regulatory positions, the reasoning goes, we
would get policies that truly reflect the public interest.' 0 In this view, the
material and nonmaterial incentives facing policymakers and regulators do not
normally matter. When "Mr. Smith goes to Washington," he seeks only to
serve the public; he seeks neither personal wealth nor the corrupting power to
run others' lives as he sees fit.
During the past thirty years, however, "public choice" scholars in
economics and political science have demonstrated conclusively what the
Founding Fathers knew instinctively: Government leaders respond to political
pressures, regardless of the consequences for the "public interest." Government officials do so, not because they are inherently corrupt or evil, but
because of the political incentives they face."
On almost any policy issue, a politician's constituency can be divided into
two groups of people. On the one hand is a relatively small minority that is
greatly affected by the policy decision. In American politics today, such
minorities include environmentalists seeking to preserve endangered subspecies
of animals, textile firms seeking protection from imports, and various

but whims and political pressures. Cost-benefit analysis at least forces policymakers to weigh
the pros and cons of policy proposals more carefully. Unfortunately, it also gives policymakers
the misleading impression that they have sufficient knowledge to make these regulatory decisions
in the first place.
9. M. Bruce Johnson, Land Use Planningand Control by the Federal Government, in No
MAN Is AN ISLAND 75 (1975).
10. In recent memory, the rhetoric employed by candidate Jerry Brown in the 1992
presidential campaign provides an excellent example of this view. Brown often argued that voters
could solve the nation's problems by throwing out "corrupt" officials. See, e.g., Adam
Nagoumey, Brown Taps Into Blue-CollarAnger; StrongShowing Possible, USA TODAY, March
16, 1992 at 3A.
11. For the evolution of these two contrasting views of regulation, see JACK C. HIGH,
REGULATION: ECONoMIc THEORY AND HISTORY (1991).
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industries seeking government subsidies. These interest groups-or "factions,"
to borrow James Madison's famous epithet in The FederalistNo. 1012 -have
strong incentives to spend time and money seeking special treatment from the
government. If they succeed, the potential monetary or nonmonetary payoff
to each member of the group can be substantial.
On the other hand, the general public usually lacks corresponding
incentives to oppose special favors for particular interest groups. The cost of
any one subsidy, tariff, or regulation often amounts to only a small amount per
person per year when divided among the general public. Even in cases where
the cost to the average citizen is much larger than a few dollars, the public has
great difficulty organizing itself to oppose special-interest programs. It is
much more expensive to organize a large group of people than a small
group-especially when the small groups might already be organized, in the
form of trade associations, professional groups, or other preexisting entities. 3
In short, special-interest policies concentrate benefits on relatively few
people while dispersing the costs among the general public. 14 Given this
result, special interests have much stronger incentives to lobby for special
treatment than the general public has to oppose them. When public officials
listen for the voice of "the public," the loudest voices they hear often are the
ones clamoring for special-interest programs or regulations. In order to "do
good"-and, of course, to stay in office-government officials then conclude
that they must heed these voices. Officials might not intend to benefit special
interests, but the logic and pressures of concentrated benefits and dispersed
costs ensure that they will often do so. The more the costs or benefits are
dispersed among the general public, the more likely it is that policymakers will
face incentives to do what is not in the public interest.
The public has the opportunity to redress its grievances at the polls, but
here again, the logic of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs rears its ugly
head. For any one individual, the costs of becoming informed and voting are
quite substantial. The expected benefits, however, are relatively small because
it is quite unlikely that any one individual's vote will be the deciding factor in
an election. For members of special-interest groups, though, the logic is
reversed.
Consider, for example, a textile worker whose job might be protected by
a clothing tariff. The potential payoff associated with learning about a
candidate's position on clothing tariffs is quite large. The cost of information
is quite low because a textile manufacturer, labor union, or other trusted

12. JAMES MADISON, No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST 129 (Benjamin F. Wright, ed. 1961).
13. ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE

ECONOMY 17 (1981); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41 (1982).
14. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 1 (1971).
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source can often be counted on to let workers know how a politician stands on
import tariffs. Furthermore, peer pressure gives members of special interest
groups a better chance of influencing elections. Each union member, for
example, knows that he probably will not cast the deciding vote, but each also
knows that his group can sway the outcome if all vote together. Each person
has an incentive to urge all of his coworkers to the polls. Thus, the logic of
concentrated benefits and dispersed costs helps ensure that elections often will
fail to undo the special-interest deals struck in the halls of the legislature.
2. Knowledge
For government officials, the knowledge problem might be even more
severe than the incentive problem. Even if government leaders sincerely want
to do the right thing, they may lack the knowledge required to do so.
In a political era dominated by policy wonks, televised pundits, and
sundry other technical experts, the issue is not whether government officials
know how to generate and understand data; the policy arena is replete with
studies that purport to demonstrate the impact of various policies. Nor is the
intelligence of government officials at issue here, for many highly intelligent
people serve in government. Rather, the knowledge problem lies in the fact
that government officials can never match the knowledge that is dispersed in
the minds of millions of producers and consumers in an advanced economy.
At the root of any advanced economic society is the concept that each
person is an expert on something. Each possesses knowledge of some
"particular circumstances of time and place." 5 Every day people improve
their quality of life by combining their own little piece of knowledge with
signals from the rest of society that help them understand how their actions
will affect everyone else. The phenomenon of dispersed knowledge inevitably
frustrates policymakers who genuinely seek to promote the public good
because they cannot possibly find out everything they would need to know to
make the appropriate policy choices.
Dispersed knowledge makes government officials' jobs difficult enough.
To add to this difficulty, much relevant knowledge is tacit."6 Tacit knowledge is not a knowledge of facts, figures, and formulae but of tastes, feelings,
and abilities. Tacit knowledge cannot be articulated to pollsters or statisticians, but it profoundly impacts the complicated tradeoffs that each person is
willing to make in regard to externalities.
The issue of secondhand tobacco smoke provides an illuminating example.
Putting aside the health effects, which are uncertain, most policy discussion

15. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC

ORDER 80 (1948).
16. MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TAcrr DIMENSION 61 (1966).
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assumes that secondhand smoke is highly and equally annoying to everyone.
If this were true, it might make sense to have a national policy banning
smoking in public places. In reality, though, people are heterogeneous, and
costs and benefits are highly subjective.17 Some people dislike secondary
smoke, some, such as other smokers, actually like it, and still others do not
care. There are even cases of people who quit smoking but like secondary
smoke and smokers who do not like it! Yet, even if one could classify
everyone into one of these categories, the intensity of annoyance with or
affection for secondary smoke cannot easily be measured-nor can the pleasure
smokers derive from being permitted to light up in peace. In any given
restaurant, the smokers, nonsmokers, employees, and owner all have better
knowledge about their relevant likes and dislikes than any regulator could hope
to acquire. Therefore, it is more appropriate to permit experimentation
tailored to the circumstances in different business establishments and public
places rather than establishing one blanket policy for all places.
The conventional regulatory approach to externalities ignores the
insuperability of problems created by dispersed and tacit knowledge. If
knowledge is dispersed, then government must hire consultants to gather it up.
If knowledge is tacit, then we must design better surveys. If people lie, then
the government must hire experts who will not be fooled. In short, regulators
adopt a "pretense of knowledge""8 in place of the real thing.
This mindset should alarm anyone seeking genuine solutions to externality
problems. The idea that regulators can rationally mitigate externalities once
they get better data parallels the more general arguments frequently advanced
on behalf of a universally failed economic policy, centralized economic
planning, i.e., communism. The would-be social planners suffer from a "fatal
conceit"-the hubris that they can rationally assess all problems and then
regulate human behavior to generate a social optimum.'
Centralized
economic planning failed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe because no
dictator or planning board could possibly gather all of the knowledge needed
to plan an economy that genuinely responds to consumer desires. 20 Economic dictators pretended to have adequate knowledge to plan society, or they
substituted their own value judgments for the will of the people. The history
of collectivist economic systems is replete with examples where societies tried
a number of approaches but failed to produce a standard of living even

17. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE 41 (1978); Steven C. Littlechild, The Problem
of Social Cost, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1978).

18. Friedrich Hayek, Nobel Lecture, The Pretence of Knowledge, December 11, 1974, at
Stockholm School of Economics.
19. For the origins of the phrase "fatal conceit," see FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT
(1990).
20. See PETER J. BoETTKE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOvIET SOCIALISM 23-27 (1990);
DON LAVOIE, RIVALRY AND CENTRAL PLANNING 26 (1985).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:595

remotely as successful as that experienced in the Western world. If we
genuinely want to solve externality problems, we must find a better model for
regulatory policy than the defunct Soviet Union.
C. Externalitiesand Property Rights
If government regulation is unlikely to solve the problem of externalities,
where do we turn? The answer often will be to-not away from-private
property rights.
The existence of externalities implies that people are not always held
accountable for all of the effects of their actions. "Folk economics," to use
Robert Bork's phrase, holds that private property creates externalities because
it permits people to put their own selfish interests ahead of those of their
fellow citizens. From a property rights perspective, the opposite is the case.
Externalities arise because private property rights are poorly defined or not
enforced. In such situations, market exchanges of property rights are difficult
or impossible, and people are not held accountable for their actions.
Ecologist Garrett Hardin pointed out this problem in his famous
description of "The Tragedy of the Commons."2 "Picture a pasture open to
all," Hardin said. When the pasture is open to all, each rancher reaps profit
by placing as many cows out to graze as possible. Of course, the decision to
pasture another cow soon generates costs; there is less grass for all of the cows
to eat, and everyone's herd may be less healthy as a result. The individual
rancher, though, does not bear the full costs associated with his decision to
22
add a cow to his herd. Those costs are spread among all of the ranchers.
To see this point more clearly, imagine a community of ten ranchers. A
rancher might think he can earn an extra $100 in profit from adding one cow
to his herd, but this cow consumes enough grass that every rancher's profit
falls by $15. For the individual rancher, it still makes sense to enlarge the
herd because the added $100 profit from an additional cow more than offsets
the $15 reduction in profits from less healthy cows. For the ten ranchers as
a whole, though, one person's decision to add one cow has reduced total
profits by $150. In this situation, all ranchers will choose to graze too many
cattle, the commons will deteriorate, and no one will make as much profit as
they could have if each used the commons more wisely. This situation will
persist as long as the pasture remains a commons.
Hardin argued that individuals and society often cultivate moral precepts
that prevent people from overusing the commons.'
Mere moral suasion
often is not enough, however. If a sense of ethical duty alone is insufficient

21. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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to prevent overuse, then government must actively manage the commons to
preserve its value. In a number of cases, Hardin opts for government
management of the commons through regulation or tax schemes. This is a
problematic solution, however, given the incentive and knowledge problems
faced by government officials.24
There is, however, another solution that generates superior incentives and
knowledge to manage the commons wisely: privatize it. As Hardin himself
recognized, when the common pasture is divided up into separate plots, each
owner directly bears the results of his decision about herd size. If someone
grazes more cows than his plot can support, the health and size of his herd
suffer. Others, who decide to raise only as many cows as their plots can
sustain, have healthier cows and more productive ranching operations. In this
way, ranchers who make wise decisions prosper while those who put too many
or too few cattle on the land suffer the consequences of their decisions.
In addition to rewarding ranchers for making ecologically and economically sound decisions, privatization of the commons helps create better knowledge. Even if some ranchers are not sure how many cows they should raise,
continual experimentation will help them to discover this information. Each
plot of land becomes a "controlled experiment" in which the results are not
affected by other ranchers' decisions. An individual rancher's decisions affect
only his own herd, and the externality problem associated with communal
ownership of land is eliminated. Independent judgment, coupled with direct
feedback, helps ranchers learn how to best raise cattle. In this way, private
property rights benefit not only the ranchers but also everyone in society who
buys milk and meat.
This solution to the commons problem illustrates a more general principle:
when private property rights are well-defined and enforced, externality
problems disappear. Private property prompts people to take all the effects of
their actions into account.
Ronald Coase made this point in The Problem of Social Cost,-5 one of
the articles that helped him to win the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics. Coase
examined, among other examples, the case of a farmer and a rancher. It

24. In the context of land use regulation, Mark Sagoff shows how government can easily find
itself in this position when it defines "the commons" expansively:
It does not matter ... that developers own the land on which they wish to build.
The argument I shall make does not depend on what a project does to the land it
immediately sits upon. It depends on how the project will affect the commons-which includes air and water quality, traffic conditions, vistas, in a word, the
public goods we include under the concept of the environment.
Mark Sagoff, Coming Late to the Commons: Investment Backed Expectations and Land Use
Management, in DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS AND THE ZONING POWER: THE CONCEPT OF
VESTED RIGHTS 55 (Richard Collins ed., 1992).
25. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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should be borne in mind, however, that the lessons learned have applicability
to any situation where there are objections to another's use of property.
In Coase's example, straying cattle destroy the farmer's crops-a
seemingly clear example of an externality. Coase demonstrated, though, that
the rancher and the fanner each have an incentive to eliminate the externality,
as long as property rights are well-defined. If the rancher is legally liable for
the damage his cattle inflict on the farmer's crops, then the rancher must either
pay the fanner to tolerate the damage or pay for a fence. If the rancher is not
liable for crops damaged by cattle, then the farmer has an incentive to pay for
a fence since it reduces his losses from crop damage.
This situation does not necessarily imply that a fence will be built. The
rancher's decision depends on the cost of the fence and the value of the crops
destroyed by the cattle. If the value of the destroyed crops exceeds the cost
of the fence, then the rancher and farmer each has an incentive to build the
fence. Depending on which party is liable for damages-the distribution of
property rights-the rancher will build the fence to avoid a lawsuit by the
farmer or the farmer will offer to pay for the fence. If the cost of the fence
exceeds the value of the crops, then neither the rancher nor the farmer has an
incentive to pay for the fence. Depending on the distribution of property
rights, either the rancher will compensate the farmer for the crop damages or
the farmer will decline to pay for the fence. In this second case, the fence
does not get built because it is not worth building. In either case, the
externality is "internalized"; the rancher must take into account the effect of
his actions on the farmer.
As long as the rancher and farmer know their rights, they can bargain to
address the externality problem. They may jointly decide to build a fence, or
they may decide the damage is not significant enough to justify the fence. In
either case, their negotiation and bargaining have generated new knowledge:
knowledge of whether the fence-or, to give another example in a different
context, an anti-air-pollution device-is worth the cost.
The situation is quite different if the farmer and rancher (or polluter and
polluted) do not know the distribution of rights. If property rights are unclear,
each person naturally will claim the property right, and the farmer and the
rancher will not be able to trade until reaching an agreement that allocates
property rights. This scenario might sound most plausible in a frontier
situation when people are first establishing claims to previously unowned
property.26 In the modern era, though, government activism has become a
26. John Locke argued that people should be allowed to claim unowned property by mixing
their labor with it, as long as they leave enough for others who come after them. JOHN LOCKE,
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 27 (1690). Epstein argues that in the modem world, this means that
people should be able to claim unowned property for their own use as long as their use of the
property increases the size of the "social pie" by moving the property from a lower valued use
to a higher valued use. EPSrEIN, supra note 1.
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major influence that clouds the definition of property rights. If people know
that they can deprive others of their ownership rights through an effective
lobbying campaign or a clever political deal, everyone's property rights
become less secure. In this situation, people have less incentive to mitigate
externalities through trade because they can use the political process to acquire
others' property without paying for it.
III. THE RATIONALE FOR (COMPENSATED) TAKINGS
A. Transaction Costs and Collective Action
Thus far, the discussion appears to demonstrate that the government's role
in mitigating externality problems is merely to ensure that private property
rights are well-defined and enforced. In such a world, takings of private
property to control externalities would be unnecessary. Since there would be
no need for the government to pay compensation for property that it did not
take, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause would be irrelevant. In reality,
however, the system of private property rights does not always work as well
as we would like.
In particular, when large numbers of people must bargain with each other
the transaction costs associated with purely voluntary efforts might be
excessive. Economists define transaction costs as the time and expense of
finding trading partners, bargaining, and enforcing agreements. The example
of the rancher and the farmer illustrates how transaction costs might make it
difficult to resolve externality issues through voluntary trade.
Negotiations are easy to envision if there is one rancher and only a few
large farms. But suppose that the ranch is very large and the cattle roam onto
a hundred different nearby farms. This situation can create barriers to trade,
regardless of whether the rancher is liable for the damage caused by straying
COWS.
If the rancher is liable, then the farmers need some way of compelling
payment for damages. Each farmer could sue the rancher, but the costs of
bringing suit and collecting on a hundred claims could well consume most of
the compensation. Alternatively, one farmer could sue the rancher, and the
rancher then would compensate all the farmers to avoid future lawsuits. In
this case, though, every farmer knows that he will be compensated, even if
another farmer brings the lawsuit. Therefore, each farmer will be tempted to
"free ride" on some other farmer's lawsuit. If the incentive to free ride is
strong, no one might ever bring the suit. A class action suit brought by an
attorney on a contingency fee basis is a possibility. In this case, though,
someone must bear the transaction costs of verifying and aggregating the
farmers' damage claims and ensuring that each farmer is fully compensated by
the settlement or court judgment. Under all of these scenarios, transaction
costs could prevent "internalization" of the externality.
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Even if the rancher is not liable, there are substantial transaction cost
problems. The farmers might rather pay for a fence than suffer the damage
from roaming cattle. If so, there are a host of free-rider problems. Somehow
the farmers need to organize to get the fence built and negotiate apportionment
of the costs. Individuals might well have incentives to hold out for a low
payment, even if they receive value from the fence. If the bargaining and
holdout problems are severe enough, the fence might not get built even though
the value of the crops saved might exceed the cost of the fence. Or, to give
another example, an anti-air-pollution device might not be installed, even if the
value of the unpolluted air exceeds the cost of the device.
B. The Government's Role
In the presence of transaction costs, it might be more cost-effective for the
farmers to use the local government as their agent rather than establishing a
new cooperative or collective organization to bargain with the rancher or build
the fence. Even if government intervention is not the option with the lowest
transaction costs, history suggests that various groups expect the government
to do something when transaction costs accompany externalities. In these
cases, it is worth questioning the types of rules that should guide the
government's activities.
Only transaction costs can legitimate the government's role. Accordingly,
the government needs to confine its actions to those that will reduce transaction costs. The government's role should not be to impose its own or its
experts' views on the farmers and ranchers, but rather to help them strike a
deal. The particulars of the solution will depend on the initial allocation of
property rights. If the rancher is liable for damage caused by cattle, then the
rancher will have to reduce the size of the herd, build fences, or compensate
the farmers. If the rancher is not liable, then the farmers will have to put up
with the damage or help pay for the fences. In either case, the government's
role is to reduce the transaction costs that hamper agreement among the
farmers and between the farmers and the rancher-or between industry and
environmentalists.
It is important to recognize that, as reducer of transaction costs, the
government does not bring to the table any new knowledge or superior insight
that will help the farmers and the rancher-or the CEO and the Sierra
Club-to cut a deal. In fact, compared to the farmers and the rancher, the
government has inferior knowledge of the preferences of the farmers, the value
the farmers place on the destroyed crops, the value the rancher places on
cattle, and the cost of fences. Therefore, if the government's proper role is
reducing transaction costs, it cannot assume that it has full knowledge of these
other things. A bargaining and exchange process is necessary to determine
whether the fence is worth its cost. If public policy truly is to promote the
solution that maximizes value for all parties, the government cannot merely
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mandate a fence, nor can it calculate an optimal tax on wandering cows. In
the absence of negotiation and trade, the government lacks the knowledge to
determine whether the mitigation of crop damage-or pollution-is worth the
cost.27

Any government intervention must permit both parties to decide whether
the benefits are worth the costs. If government proposes requiring fences even
though the rancher is not liable, the government also must propose a way that
the farmers will pay for the fence or compensate the rancher for the cost. If
the rancher is liable but the government proposes unlimited cattle wandering,
it must also propose a way that the rancher will compensate the farmers for
the value of the destroyed crops. In this way, the people receiving the benefit
of any proposed regulation are also presented with a bill for the costs and
ideally they-not government officials-would decide whether the benefits of
the proposed regulation or other government action are worth the costs.
The Takings Clause approximates this type of system, although not
perfectly. Under the Clause, legislators and regulators are permitted to impose
a solution to mitigate externalities. The people affected by the chosen solution
do not usually have the option of rejecting it directly. But to the extent that
the government curtails private property rights, the property owners must be
compensated, and general taxation provides the funds for the compensation.
Politicians must then weigh the perceived benefits of regulation against the
cost in tax dollars. Instead of getting something for "free," the public would
ideally know that the decision to regulate carries with it a tax-cost. At some
point, politicians who impose too many regulations that are not worth the cost
will find their popularity dwindling because of the excessive tax burden that
accompanies the excessive regulation.28
C. Problems with the Takings Clause
Despite these benefits, the Takings Clause is not a panacea. Policymakers
who compensate property owners with tax dollars still face incentive and
knowledge problems that will diminish the quality of their decisions.
The government's decision to spend tax dollars still is subject to the logic
of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. In many cases, regulation that
impinges on private property rights will confer substantial benefits upon some
narrow interest group. Thus, that group has strong incentives to lobby for the
measure. The general public, though, pays for the regulation through taxes,

27. Note that the tax revenues extracted from one party must be paid to the other party to
achieve compensation. If the government taxes the rancher and then spends the money on
something else, the farmers may not receive compensation.
28. In a world of mobile financial capital and people, governments might have stronger
incentives to adopt the levels of regulation and taxation that actually reflect popular preferences.
See DWIGHT LEE & RICHARD MCKENZIE, QUICKSILVER CAPITAL (1991).
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and the burden of taxation is spread across the public at large. Individual
citizens, therefore, have relatively weak incentives to lobby against any one
regulatory initiative. Indeed, the average citizen has much less incentive to
lobby against a particular regulation than the average property owner faced
with the prospect of an uncompensated taking. Therefore, even if the
government must pay when it takes, public officials will face strong incentives
to benefit small factions at the expense of the public.
Even if policymakers want to do the right thing, they still face the
"knowledge problem" of determining the public benefits of regulation and
weighing them against the costs. The government cannot "know" these
benefits and costs independent of market transactions, and it will be difficult
to discern what market participants would have chosen to do if government
had not effected a taking. In many cases, tax revenues are general revenues.
Sometimes specific tax revenues are earmarked for specific purposes, but they
rarely are earmarked to compensate the victims of specific regulatory takings.
Voters "buy" a bundle of goods and services from their government, and the
voting mechanism does not usually permit them to give government officials
detailed instructions on how the money should be spent. Policymakers receive
a pot of revenues and a great deal of discretion to divide revenues among
various projects in the bundle. As a result, it is not clear how much voters are
willing to pay as compensation for a regulatory taking. Therefore, in any
given case, it will not be clear whether a proposed regulation is worth the
cost.
These drawbacks should not, of course, be construed as arguments against
compensation for regulatory takings. To the contrary, they suggest that even
a government that must pay when it takes will still have a bias toward taking
too much. A vigorous interpretation of the Takings Clause would at least
force policymakers to recognize that every regulation imposes costs. Unlike
cost-benefit studies, which can often be manipulated to justify proposed
regulations, the Takings Clause requires that the government put real dollars
on the table in exchange for public benefits. An expansive interpretation of
the Takings Clause would, therefore, help move the level of regulation closer
to that which the public as a whole is actually willing to bear.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our society needs private property rights because economic activity is too
complex to be planned and orchestrated by a dictator, a committee of experts,
or even an electronic town hall. Private property rights divide decision
making about the use of resources among millions of independent decisionmakers, and these rights install accountability for decisions. As a result,
private property permits an advanced economy to prosper through a complex
division of labor that could not be rationally planned by anyone.
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In much popular discussion, private property is considered a barrier to the
wise use of resources because individuals making independent decisions about
the use of property are supposedly accountable only to themselves. However,
in a free society, nothing could be further from the truth. The opportunity to
earn income from property makes the owner accountable to many other
individuals in society. If the owner does not use his property to produce
something of value to others, his earnings will be diminished. This profit
incentive applies not just in the short run but also over the long term because
asset markets continually reward people who find ways to enhance the value
of their property to other people. In a system of private property, the owners
are responsible to the wills of millions of customers rather than a handful of
regulators or interest groups.
Given these realities, the Takings Clause helps discipline public decisions
in cases where collective action through government is necessary. By forcing
the government to pay when it takes, the clause forces government to weigh
the costs of regulation against the benefits. Due to the nature of governmental
processes, this weighing will not be perfect, and the government still may
choose to regulate in cases when the cost to taxpayers outweighs the benefits
of regulation. Nevertheless, the Takings Clause creates a rough screening
process that can help discourage some of the least justifiable regulatory
initiatives.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss4/5

18

